A Stochastic Stackelberg Game Framework for Demand-side Participation in the Reserve Market

Shibo Chen; Wenjie Liu; Haoyu Miao; Zhenwei Guo; Zaiyue Yang

doi:10.1109/VTC2021-Fall52928.2021.9625227

A Stochastic Stackelberg Game Framework for Demand-side Participation in the Reserve Market

Shibo Chen, Wenjie Liu, Haoyu Miao, Zhenwei Guo, Zaiyue Yang

Research output: Chapter in Book/Conference Proceeding/Report › Conference Paper published in a book › peer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper, we consider a scenario where each aggregator represents a group of demand-side users to participate in the reserve market. The competition among aggregators and the conventional thermal power plant (TPP) is analyzed using game theoretic methods. In consideration of the possible uncertainty about market information for aggregators, a stochastic Stackelberg game model is proposed, where aggregators act as multiple leaders and the TPP acts as the follower. Existence and uniqueness of the stochastic Stackelberg equilibrium is further derived, and a distributed algorithm is developed to approximate it. Our simulation results validate our proposed framework and demonstrate that demand-side participation in the reserve market can significantly reduce the total system cost.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	2021 IEEE 94th Vehicular Technology Conference, VTC 2021-Fall - Proceedings
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ISBN (Electronic)	9781665413688
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/VTC2021-Fall52928.2021.9625227
Publication status	Published - 2021
Externally published	Yes
Event	94th IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference, VTC 2021-Fall - Virtual, Online, United States Duration: 27 Sept 2021 → 30 Sept 2021

Publication series

Name	IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference
Volume	2021-September
ISSN (Print)	1550-2252

Conference

Conference	94th IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference, VTC 2021-Fall
Country/Territory	United States
City	Virtual, Online
Period	27/09/21 → 30/09/21

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 IEEE.

Keywords

Reserve market
Stackelberg game
aggregators
stochastic optimization

Access to Document

10.1109/VTC2021-Fall52928.2021.9625227

Cite this

Chen, S., Liu, W., Miao, H., Guo, Z., & Yang, Z. (2021). A Stochastic Stackelberg Game Framework for Demand-side Participation in the Reserve Market. In 2021 IEEE 94th Vehicular Technology Conference, VTC 2021-Fall - Proceedings (IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference; Vol. 2021-September). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/VTC2021-Fall52928.2021.9625227

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title = "A Stochastic Stackelberg Game Framework for Demand-side Participation in the Reserve Market",

abstract = "In this paper, we consider a scenario where each aggregator represents a group of demand-side users to participate in the reserve market. The competition among aggregators and the conventional thermal power plant (TPP) is analyzed using game theoretic methods. In consideration of the possible uncertainty about market information for aggregators, a stochastic Stackelberg game model is proposed, where aggregators act as multiple leaders and the TPP acts as the follower. Existence and uniqueness of the stochastic Stackelberg equilibrium is further derived, and a distributed algorithm is developed to approximate it. Our simulation results validate our proposed framework and demonstrate that demand-side participation in the reserve market can significantly reduce the total system cost.",

keywords = "Reserve market, Stackelberg game, aggregators, stochastic optimization",

author = "Shibo Chen and Wenjie Liu and Haoyu Miao and Zhenwei Guo and Zaiyue Yang",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2021 IEEE.; 94th IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference, VTC 2021-Fall ; Conference date: 27-09-2021 Through 30-09-2021",

year = "2021",

doi = "10.1109/VTC2021-Fall52928.2021.9625227",

language = "English",

series = "IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference",

publisher = "Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.",

booktitle = "2021 IEEE 94th Vehicular Technology Conference, VTC 2021-Fall - Proceedings",

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Chen, S, Liu, W, Miao, H, Guo, Z & Yang, Z 2021, A Stochastic Stackelberg Game Framework for Demand-side Participation in the Reserve Market. in 2021 IEEE 94th Vehicular Technology Conference, VTC 2021-Fall - Proceedings. IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference, vol. 2021-September, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 94th IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference, VTC 2021-Fall, Virtual, Online, United States, 27/09/21. https://doi.org/10.1109/VTC2021-Fall52928.2021.9625227

A Stochastic Stackelberg Game Framework for Demand-side Participation in the Reserve Market. / Chen, Shibo; Liu, Wenjie; Miao, Haoyu et al.
2021 IEEE 94th Vehicular Technology Conference, VTC 2021-Fall - Proceedings. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2021. (IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference; Vol. 2021-September).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Conference Proceeding/Report › Conference Paper published in a book › peer-review

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T1 - A Stochastic Stackelberg Game Framework for Demand-side Participation in the Reserve Market

AU - Chen, Shibo

AU - Liu, Wenjie

AU - Miao, Haoyu

AU - Guo, Zhenwei

AU - Yang, Zaiyue

PY - 2021

Y1 - 2021

N2 - In this paper, we consider a scenario where each aggregator represents a group of demand-side users to participate in the reserve market. The competition among aggregators and the conventional thermal power plant (TPP) is analyzed using game theoretic methods. In consideration of the possible uncertainty about market information for aggregators, a stochastic Stackelberg game model is proposed, where aggregators act as multiple leaders and the TPP acts as the follower. Existence and uniqueness of the stochastic Stackelberg equilibrium is further derived, and a distributed algorithm is developed to approximate it. Our simulation results validate our proposed framework and demonstrate that demand-side participation in the reserve market can significantly reduce the total system cost.

AB - In this paper, we consider a scenario where each aggregator represents a group of demand-side users to participate in the reserve market. The competition among aggregators and the conventional thermal power plant (TPP) is analyzed using game theoretic methods. In consideration of the possible uncertainty about market information for aggregators, a stochastic Stackelberg game model is proposed, where aggregators act as multiple leaders and the TPP acts as the follower. Existence and uniqueness of the stochastic Stackelberg equilibrium is further derived, and a distributed algorithm is developed to approximate it. Our simulation results validate our proposed framework and demonstrate that demand-side participation in the reserve market can significantly reduce the total system cost.

KW - Reserve market

KW - Stackelberg game

KW - aggregators

KW - stochastic optimization

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UR - https://openalex.org/W4200251088

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85122990455

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DO - 10.1109/VTC2021-Fall52928.2021.9625227

M3 - Conference Paper published in a book

T3 - IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference

BT - 2021 IEEE 94th Vehicular Technology Conference, VTC 2021-Fall - Proceedings

PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.

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Y2 - 27 September 2021 through 30 September 2021

ER -

A Stochastic Stackelberg Game Framework for Demand-side Participation in the Reserve Market

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