Audited reputation

Hong Xu; Jianqing Chen; Andrew B. Whinston

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2008.02.035

Audited reputation

Hong Xu^*, Jianqing Chen, Andrew B. Whinston

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal Article › peer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We study reputations with imperfect audit and a reputation market. The main result shows the existence of a separating equilibrium in the reputation market, which contrasts with Tadelis [Tadelis, S., 2002, The market for reputations as an incentive mechanism, Journal of Political Economy 110(4), 854-882].

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	359-362
Number of pages	4
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	100
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2008.02.035
Publication status	Published - Sept 2008
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Audit
Infinitely repeated game
Reputation

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10.1016/j.econlet.2008.02.035

Cite this

@article{0b9a2aba5588461d9bfbebafecd72c4a,

title = "Audited reputation",

abstract = "We study reputations with imperfect audit and a reputation market. The main result shows the existence of a separating equilibrium in the reputation market, which contrasts with Tadelis [Tadelis, S., 2002, The market for reputations as an incentive mechanism, Journal of Political Economy 110(4), 854-882].",

keywords = "Audit, Infinitely repeated game, Reputation",

author = "Hong Xu and Jianqing Chen and Whinston, \{Andrew B.\}",

year = "2008",

month = sep,

doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2008.02.035",

language = "English",

volume = "100",

pages = "359--362",

journal = "Economics Letters",

issn = "0165-1765",

publisher = "Elsevier B.V.",

number = "3",

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TY - JOUR

T1 - Audited reputation

AU - Xu, Hong

AU - Chen, Jianqing

AU - Whinston, Andrew B.

PY - 2008/9

Y1 - 2008/9

N2 - We study reputations with imperfect audit and a reputation market. The main result shows the existence of a separating equilibrium in the reputation market, which contrasts with Tadelis [Tadelis, S., 2002, The market for reputations as an incentive mechanism, Journal of Political Economy 110(4), 854-882].

AB - We study reputations with imperfect audit and a reputation market. The main result shows the existence of a separating equilibrium in the reputation market, which contrasts with Tadelis [Tadelis, S., 2002, The market for reputations as an incentive mechanism, Journal of Political Economy 110(4), 854-882].

KW - Audit

KW - Infinitely repeated game

KW - Reputation

UR - https://www.webofscience.com/wos/woscc/full-record/WOS:000259438700011

UR - https://openalex.org/W4234787028

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/49349095254

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2008.02.035

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2008.02.035

M3 - Journal Article

SN - 0165-1765

VL - 100

SP - 359

EP - 362

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

IS - 3

ER -

Audited reputation

Abstract

Keywords

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