TY - JOUR
T1 - Competitive outsourcing
T2 - Choosing between value-added services and key component supplying capability
AU - Lin, Yen Ting
AU - Chen, Ying Ju
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2014 Taylor and Francis.
PY - 2015/6/18
Y1 - 2015/6/18
N2 - We examine outsourcing strategies of two competing firms. Each of the firms outsources product manufacturing to one of the two manufacturers. In addition to product manufacturing, the first manufacturer also produces a key component that is required by every product. On the other hand, the second manufacturer provides additional services that enhance product value. We characterise the firms equilibrium choice of outsourced manufacturers. We demonstrate that difference in the manufacturers operational advantages can result in asymmetric outsourcing decisions for ex-ante symmetric firms. Firm profitability can be Pareto improved when the manufacturer who produces the key component gains first-mover advantage. Moreover, that manufacturer can benefit from the entrance of a competitor in the key component market. Finally, even though the firms select their outsourced manufacturers based on self-interest, the resulting equilibrium outsourcing scenario can be the one that also maximises profitability of the manufacturers and the entire supply chain.
AB - We examine outsourcing strategies of two competing firms. Each of the firms outsources product manufacturing to one of the two manufacturers. In addition to product manufacturing, the first manufacturer also produces a key component that is required by every product. On the other hand, the second manufacturer provides additional services that enhance product value. We characterise the firms equilibrium choice of outsourced manufacturers. We demonstrate that difference in the manufacturers operational advantages can result in asymmetric outsourcing decisions for ex-ante symmetric firms. Firm profitability can be Pareto improved when the manufacturer who produces the key component gains first-mover advantage. Moreover, that manufacturer can benefit from the entrance of a competitor in the key component market. Finally, even though the firms select their outsourced manufacturers based on self-interest, the resulting equilibrium outsourcing scenario can be the one that also maximises profitability of the manufacturers and the entire supply chain.
KW - game theory
KW - outsourcing
KW - supply chain management
UR - https://www.webofscience.com/wos/woscc/full-record/WOS:000353512600008
UR - https://openalex.org/W2088668568
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84928585365
U2 - 10.1080/00207543.2014.985394
DO - 10.1080/00207543.2014.985394
M3 - Journal Article
SN - 0020-7543
VL - 53
SP - 3635
EP - 3650
JO - International Journal of Production Research
JF - International Journal of Production Research
IS - 12
ER -