Contrastivism and non-contrastivism in scientific explanation

Yafeng Shan*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal Articlepeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The nature of scientific explanation is controversial. Some maintain that all scientific explanations have to be contrastive in nature (contrastivism). However, others argue that no scientific explanation is genuinely contrastive (non-contrastivism). In addition, a compatibilist view has been recently devloped. It is argued that the debate between contrastivism and non-contrastivism is merely a linguistic dispute rather than a genuine disagreement on the nature of scientific explanation. Scientific explanations are both contrastive and non-contrastive in some sense (compatibilism). This paper examines the debate between contrastivism and non-contrastivism in scientific explanation. It begins with a critical review of the arguments for contrastivism, for non-contrastivism, and for compatibilism and concludes with some remarks on the prospect of the issue.

Original languageEnglish
Article numbere12613
JournalPhilosophy Compass
Volume14
Issue number8
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2019
Externally publishedYes

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 The Author(s) Philosophy Compass © 2019 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

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