Abstract
The nature of scientific explanation is controversial. Some maintain that all scientific explanations have to be contrastive in nature (contrastivism). However, others argue that no scientific explanation is genuinely contrastive (non-contrastivism). In addition, a compatibilist view has been recently devloped. It is argued that the debate between contrastivism and non-contrastivism is merely a linguistic dispute rather than a genuine disagreement on the nature of scientific explanation. Scientific explanations are both contrastive and non-contrastive in some sense (compatibilism). This paper examines the debate between contrastivism and non-contrastivism in scientific explanation. It begins with a critical review of the arguments for contrastivism, for non-contrastivism, and for compatibilism and concludes with some remarks on the prospect of the issue.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | e12613 |
| Journal | Philosophy Compass |
| Volume | 14 |
| Issue number | 8 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2019 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2019 The Author(s) Philosophy Compass © 2019 John Wiley & Sons Ltd