Abstract
This paper presents an example in which players never learn to play Nash
equilibrium in the repeated games when one believes that others are correlating their
strategies, though his belief satisfies `a grain of truth' condition. A sufficient condition on the
learning procedure to restore the convergence is suggested and turns out to be quite
demanding.
equilibrium in the repeated games when one believes that others are correlating their
strategies, though his belief satisfies `a grain of truth' condition. A sufficient condition on the
learning procedure to restore the convergence is suggested and turns out to be quite
demanding.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 52-61 |
| Journal | Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics |
| Volume | 18 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| Publication status | Published - Dec 2007 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Repeated game
- Bayesian learning
- convergence to Nash equilibrium
- correlation on belief
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