Flexauc auction: Serving dynamic demand in wireless market

Peng Lin; Xiaojun Feng; Qian Zhang

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-06799-5_5

Flexauc auction: Serving dynamic demand in wireless market

Peng Lin^*, Xiaojun Feng, Qian Zhang

^*Corresponding author for this work

Division of Integrative Systems and Design

Research output: Chapter in Book/Conference Proceeding/Report › Book Chapter › peer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

In wireless market, major operators buy spectrum through auctions held by spectrum regulators and serve end users. How much spectrum should an operator buy and how should he set the optimal service tariff to maximize his own benefits are challenging and important research problems. On one hand, a Wireless Service Provider’s (WSP’s) strategies in spectrum auction and service provision are coupled together. On the other hand, spectrum holder wants to design an auction to flexibly satisfy operators’ spectrum requirement, improving sales revenue and maximize social welfare. Previous works do not see the big picture and usually study one of the sub-problems.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	SpringerBriefs in Computer Science
Publisher	Springer
Pages	57-75
Number of pages	19
Edition	9783319067988
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06799-5_5
Publication status	Published - 2014

Publication series

Name	SpringerBriefs in Computer Science
Number	9783319067988
Volume	0
ISSN (Print)	2191-5768
ISSN (Electronic)	2191-5776

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© The Author(s) 2014.

Keywords

Bidding strategy
Combinatorial auction
Optimal price
Social welfare
Uniform price

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-319-06799-5_5

Cite this

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abstract = "In wireless market, major operators buy spectrum through auctions held by spectrum regulators and serve end users. How much spectrum should an operator buy and how should he set the optimal service tariff to maximize his own benefits are challenging and important research problems. On one hand, a Wireless Service Provider{\textquoteright}s (WSP{\textquoteright}s) strategies in spectrum auction and service provision are coupled together. On the other hand, spectrum holder wants to design an auction to flexibly satisfy operators{\textquoteright} spectrum requirement, improving sales revenue and maximize social welfare. Previous works do not see the big picture and usually study one of the sub-problems.",

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N2 - In wireless market, major operators buy spectrum through auctions held by spectrum regulators and serve end users. How much spectrum should an operator buy and how should he set the optimal service tariff to maximize his own benefits are challenging and important research problems. On one hand, a Wireless Service Provider’s (WSP’s) strategies in spectrum auction and service provision are coupled together. On the other hand, spectrum holder wants to design an auction to flexibly satisfy operators’ spectrum requirement, improving sales revenue and maximize social welfare. Previous works do not see the big picture and usually study one of the sub-problems.

AB - In wireless market, major operators buy spectrum through auctions held by spectrum regulators and serve end users. How much spectrum should an operator buy and how should he set the optimal service tariff to maximize his own benefits are challenging and important research problems. On one hand, a Wireless Service Provider’s (WSP’s) strategies in spectrum auction and service provision are coupled together. On the other hand, spectrum holder wants to design an auction to flexibly satisfy operators’ spectrum requirement, improving sales revenue and maximize social welfare. Previous works do not see the big picture and usually study one of the sub-problems.

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KW - Social welfare

KW - Uniform price

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ER -

Flexauc auction: Serving dynamic demand in wireless market

Abstract

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Keywords

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