Flexauc: Serving dynamic demands in spectrum trading markets with flexible auction

Peng Lin, Xiaojun Feng, Qian Zhang

Research output: Chapter in Book/Conference Proceeding/ReportConference Paper published in a bookpeer-review

12 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In spectrum trading markets, auctions are organized by spectrum holders (SHs) to distribute channels. As buyers, wireless service providers (WSPs) acquire channels to deploy services to end users. To optimize the profits, it is essential for the WSPs to determine their bidding strategies, which are affected by two key aspects: the service position to the end users and the auction schemes enforced by the SH. In this paper, we jointly study the strategy of the SH in the auction design and the WSPs' strategies in the service provisions and biddings. The WSP's optimal strategy in the auction can be flexible in term of demands and valuations. To optimize social welfare and enable the WSPs to reveal truthful flexible demands, we design Flexauc, a novel auction mechanism for the SH. We prove theoretically that Flexauc not only maximizes the social welfare but also preserves other nice properties: truthfulness and computational tractability.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationIEEE INFOCOM 2014 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages2265-2273
Number of pages9
ISBN (Print)9781479933600
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014
Event33rd IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, IEEE INFOCOM 2014 - Toronto, ON, Canada
Duration: 27 Apr 20142 May 2014

Publication series

NameProceedings - IEEE INFOCOM
ISSN (Print)0743-166X

Conference

Conference33rd IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, IEEE INFOCOM 2014
Country/TerritoryCanada
CityToronto, ON
Period27/04/142/05/14

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