How much to share: A repeated game model for peer-to-peer streaming under service differentiation incentives

Xin Xiao; Qian Zhang; Yuanchun Shi; Yuan Gao

doi:10.1109/TPDS.2011.167

How much to share: A repeated game model for peer-to-peer streaming under service differentiation incentives

Xin Xiao^*, Qian Zhang, Yuanchun Shi, Yuan Gao

^*Corresponding author for this work

Division of Integrative Systems and Design

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal Article › peer-review

24 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper, we propose a service differentiation incentive for P2P streaming system, according to peers' instant contributions. Also, a repeated game model is designed to analyze how much the peers should contribute in each round under this incentive. Simulations show that satisfying streaming quality is achieved in the Nash Equilibrium state.

Original language	English
Article number	6087361
Pages (from-to)	288-295
Number of pages	8
Journal	IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
Volume	23
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/TPDS.2011.167
Publication status	Published - 2012

Keywords

Free riding
Nash Equilibrium
P2P streaming
game theory
incentives

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10.1109/TPDS.2011.167

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title = "How much to share: A repeated game model for peer-to-peer streaming under service differentiation incentives",

abstract = "In this paper, we propose a service differentiation incentive for P2P streaming system, according to peers' instant contributions. Also, a repeated game model is designed to analyze how much the peers should contribute in each round under this incentive. Simulations show that satisfying streaming quality is achieved in the Nash Equilibrium state.",

keywords = "Free riding, Nash Equilibrium, P2P streaming, game theory, incentives",

author = "Xin Xiao and Qian Zhang and Yuanchun Shi and Yuan Gao",

year = "2012",

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T2 - A repeated game model for peer-to-peer streaming under service differentiation incentives

AU - Xiao, Xin

AU - Zhang, Qian

AU - Shi, Yuanchun

AU - Gao, Yuan

PY - 2012

Y1 - 2012

N2 - In this paper, we propose a service differentiation incentive for P2P streaming system, according to peers' instant contributions. Also, a repeated game model is designed to analyze how much the peers should contribute in each round under this incentive. Simulations show that satisfying streaming quality is achieved in the Nash Equilibrium state.

AB - In this paper, we propose a service differentiation incentive for P2P streaming system, according to peers' instant contributions. Also, a repeated game model is designed to analyze how much the peers should contribute in each round under this incentive. Simulations show that satisfying streaming quality is achieved in the Nash Equilibrium state.

KW - Free riding

KW - Nash Equilibrium

KW - P2P streaming

KW - game theory

KW - incentives

UR - https://www.webofscience.com/wos/woscc/full-record/WOS:000298381100011

UR - https://openalex.org/W1976501810

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84855391793

U2 - 10.1109/TPDS.2011.167

DO - 10.1109/TPDS.2011.167

M3 - Journal Article

SN - 1045-9219

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JO - IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems

JF - IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems

IS - 2

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ER -

How much to share: A repeated game model for peer-to-peer streaming under service differentiation incentives

Abstract

Keywords

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