`Mao's Last Revolution': A Loyalty-competence Tradeoff

Competent subordinates, while better at assisting dictators, are also more capable of usurping power. We empirically investigate the loyalty-competence tradeoff that Mao Zedong experienced in selecting senior officials using a biographical dataset of Central Committee (CC) members in China from 1945-82. Our results show that during the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), competent CC members were often replaced by mediocre members because the foundation and consolidation of the new-born regime increased the stakes for Mao, which made competent members more like challengers than helpers. We further rule out some alternative explanations, such as the decrease in Mao's own competence (e.g., health) and ideological changes, and find support for the dictator's stakes hypothesis. We also show that after Mao's death in 1976, the absence of this tradeoff ensured that the competent were more likely to be selected.