Abstract
Information-centric networking (ICN) is a popular research topic. At its heart is the concept of in-network caching. Various algorithms have been proposed for optimizing ICN caching, many of which rely on collaborative principles, i.e. multiple caches interacting to decide what to store. Past work has assumed altruistic nodes that will sacrifice their own performance for the global optimum. We argue that this assumption is insufficient and oversimplifies the reality. We address this problem by modeling the in-network caching problem as a Nash bargaining game. We develop optimal and heuristic caching solutions that consider both performance and fairness. We argue that only algorithms that are fair to all parties involved in caching will encourage engagement and cooperation. Through extensive simulations, we show our heuristic solution, FairCache, ensures that all collaborative caches achieve performance gains without undermining the performance of others.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 7945473 |
| Pages (from-to) | 2686-2700 |
| Number of pages | 15 |
| Journal | IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking |
| Volume | 25 |
| Issue number | 5 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Oct 2017 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 1993-2012 IEEE.
Keywords
- Information-centric networking
- algorithm design
- game theory
- modeling
- optimisation
- resources allocation