RIStealth: Practical and Covert Physical-Layer Attack against WiFi-based Intrusion Detection via Reconfigurable Intelligent Surface

Yuxuan Zhou, Chenggao Li, Huangxun Chen, Qian Zhang

Research output: Chapter in Book/Conference Proceeding/ReportConference Paper published in a bookpeer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The emerging reconfigurable intelligent surface (RIS) technique introduces novel threats to wireless sensing owing to its channel customization ability. Unlike active radios, the RIS's interference behaves akin to natural reflections, exhibiting a higher level of stealthiness and difficulty in detection. However, the majority of current RIS-based attacks lack generalizability to real-world scenarios, as they assume complete coverage of the RIS over objects and develop their techniques within electromagnetic-controlled environments such as an anechoic chamber. To bridge this gap, we present RIStealth, a practical and covert attack that leverages RIS technology to render a moving individual undetectable by WiFi-based intrusion detection systems in real-life scenarios. RIStealth integrates the strengths of both motion reduction and threshold lifting strategies to address challenges of limited RIS affordability, constrained cooperation in adversary settings, and complex and unpredictable environments. Through real-world evaluations conducted with our RIS prototype, we demonstrate that RIStealth effectively reduces the victim's intrusion detection rate from 95.1% to 16.4%. Our findings shed light on the practical threats posed by RIS, thereby encouraging further countermeasure development.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationSenSys 2023 - Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Embedded Networked Sensors Systems
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery, Inc
Pages195-208
Number of pages14
ISBN (Electronic)9798400704147
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 12 Nov 2023
Event21st ACM Conference on Embedded Networked Sensors Systems, SenSys 2023 - Istanbul, Turkey
Duration: 13 Nov 202315 Nov 2023

Publication series

NameSenSys 2023 - Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Embedded Networked Sensors Systems

Conference

Conference21st ACM Conference on Embedded Networked Sensors Systems, SenSys 2023
Country/TerritoryTurkey
CityIstanbul
Period13/11/2315/11/23

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2023 Copyright is held by the owner/author(s). Publication rights licensed to ACM.

Keywords

  • intrusion detection
  • physical-layer attack
  • reconfigurable intelligent surface
  • wireless sensing

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