TY - GEN
T1 - Spectrum leasing to multiple cooperating secondary cellular networks
AU - Yi, Youwen
AU - Zhang, Jin
AU - Zhang, Qian
AU - Jiang, Tao
PY - 2011
Y1 - 2011
N2 - In this paper, we focus on the dynamic spectrum access of infrastructure-based cognitive radio networks, a primary network and multiple secondary networks, which are collocated with each other. To improve network performance of all networks, we propose a cooperative communication-aware spectrum leasing framework. In the proposed framework, the primary network leverages secondary APs as cooperative relays, and decides the optimal strategy on the relay selection and the price for spectrum leasing. Based on primary network's strategy, secondary networks determine the length of spectrum access time they purchase from the primary network. Finally, each network allocates the total spectrum access time of the network among its end users. The above sequential decision procedure is formulated as a Stackelberg game, with primary network acting as the leader and secondary networks as the followers, and a unique Nash Equilibrium (NE) point is achieved through backward induction analysis. At this NE point, all networks maximize their utilities in terms of transmission rate and revenue/payment. Simulation results show that the primary network and secondary networks achieve higher utilities by exploiting cooperative transmission under our proposed framework, which gives all networks incentive for cooperation.
AB - In this paper, we focus on the dynamic spectrum access of infrastructure-based cognitive radio networks, a primary network and multiple secondary networks, which are collocated with each other. To improve network performance of all networks, we propose a cooperative communication-aware spectrum leasing framework. In the proposed framework, the primary network leverages secondary APs as cooperative relays, and decides the optimal strategy on the relay selection and the price for spectrum leasing. Based on primary network's strategy, secondary networks determine the length of spectrum access time they purchase from the primary network. Finally, each network allocates the total spectrum access time of the network among its end users. The above sequential decision procedure is formulated as a Stackelberg game, with primary network acting as the leader and secondary networks as the followers, and a unique Nash Equilibrium (NE) point is achieved through backward induction analysis. At this NE point, all networks maximize their utilities in terms of transmission rate and revenue/payment. Simulation results show that the primary network and secondary networks achieve higher utilities by exploiting cooperative transmission under our proposed framework, which gives all networks incentive for cooperation.
UR - https://openalex.org/W2113407358
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/80052160854
U2 - 10.1109/icc.2011.5963288
DO - 10.1109/icc.2011.5963288
M3 - Conference Paper published in a book
SN - 9781612842332
T3 - IEEE International Conference on Communications
BT - 2011 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2011
T2 - 2011 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2011
Y2 - 5 June 2011 through 9 June 2011
ER -