Abstract
We analyze the impact of a 75 pct. Break-Through rule on 1,035 European firms with dual class shares. In 3-5 pct. of the firms the controlling owners incur a direct loss of control, while in another 11-17 pct. of the firms, the controlling owners are likely to incur a loss of control. Firms in Germany, Italy and the Scandinavian countries are more likely to incur a loss of control. The restrictions that the Break-Through rule put on the ability of these firms to issue new shares to outsiders without changing the control structure are also estimated. We conclude that a significant number of firms with dual class shares in the European Union will be affected by a 75 pct. Break-Through rule.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 259-283 |
| Number of pages | 25 |
| Journal | European Journal of Law and Economics |
| Volume | 17 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| Publication status | Published - May 2004 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Break-Through rule
- Corporate governance
- Corporate law
- Dual class shares
- European Union
- Takeover regulation