The impact of a Break-Through rule on European firms

Morten Bennedsen, Kasper Meisner Nielsen

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal Articlepeer-review

9 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We analyze the impact of a 75 pct. Break-Through rule on 1,035 European firms with dual class shares. In 3-5 pct. of the firms the controlling owners incur a direct loss of control, while in another 11-17 pct. of the firms, the controlling owners are likely to incur a loss of control. Firms in Germany, Italy and the Scandinavian countries are more likely to incur a loss of control. The restrictions that the Break-Through rule put on the ability of these firms to issue new shares to outsiders without changing the control structure are also estimated. We conclude that a significant number of firms with dual class shares in the European Union will be affected by a 75 pct. Break-Through rule.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)259-283
Number of pages25
JournalEuropean Journal of Law and Economics
Volume17
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - May 2004
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Break-Through rule
  • Corporate governance
  • Corporate law
  • Dual class shares
  • European Union
  • Takeover regulation

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