The politics of SARS: The WHO, Hong Kong and mainland China

The lifting of the World Health Organisation (WHO) travel advisory for Hong Kong on 23 May 2003 caught everyone by surprise. Ever since late February the SARS outbreak had almost completely taken over daily life. There was a sense that although things might take on the appearance of normality again soon enough, in fact the ground had shifted under Hong Kong's feet. As SARS roared through Hong Kong, it forced the city to evaluate the readiness of its institutions to deal with infectious disease - An issue that had received little real attention despite recent warning signs. During the avian flu outbreak in 1997, over a million birds had to be slaughtered. What most people seemed to have forgotten was that the avian flu affected humans as well, although there were only 18 cases of the disease. The 1997 outbreak was caused by a new influenza virus that had jumped from chickens to humans. Fortunately, the virus (named "H5N1") was unable to transmit easily from person to person. Those who became inflected, however, became very ill, resulting in six deaths.1 The avian flu returned in 1999, but the outbreak soon passed and Hong Kong lapsed back into complacency. In 2003, SARS left a much more permanent mark on Hong Kong's consciousness. Next time - And there could well be a next time - The city will have to be more prepared to meet the assault. The WHO's Dr. Henk Bekedam warned that it is not enough to be 100% ready; authorities "need to be 300% ready for SARS."2 Experts have said that even if they find a vaccine for SARS, other new infectious diseases may be lurking. But in the final analysis, the international community has much to be grateful for in Hong Kong's handling of SARS. The situation could have been much worse for both China and the world had Hong Kong been less open about the disease or the severity of the outbreak (see Chapter 10). One unexpected outcome of SARS is that Hong Kong now sees itself more clearly as part of the neighbourhood of Guangdong Province. Furthermore, it has also become more evident that Hong Kong is an integral part of China, although it functions as a Special Administrative Region (SAR). Indeed, the SARS experience indicated the extent of the difference between institutional instincts and habits in Hong Kong and on the mainland. Behavioural differences between Guangdong and Beijing were also apparent. The challenge now is to ensure that Hong Kong's normal practice of transparency continues and is viewed in a positive and not a threatening light on the mainland, so that the authorities in both areas benefit. It should be blindingly clear to Beijing that its customary obsession with secrecy was the primary cause of the worldwide SARS crisis. As a member of the global community, Beijing is expected to abide by a standard of behaviour that does not condone hiding information.