Does morality require external sanction? : a discussion from the perspectives of evolutionary psychology, Mencius and Xunzi

Abstract

This thesis aims to discuss how morality without external sanction is rendered possible in the context of naturalism. It attempts to bring out the discussion from both the contemporary Western perspective of evolutionary psychology and the perspectives of early Confucianism, Mencius and Xunzi in particular. Through the discussion, the significance of moral sentiments in the making of moral judgments is highlighted. The first part of the thesis focuses on the explanation of helping behaviors offered from the perspective of evolutionary psychology. It aims to look into the notion: whether morality can be innate, and arguments on whether evolution can or cannot account for innate morality will be examined. Through discussion, the importance of moral sentiments in acknowledging the truth value of moral propositions and motivating one to be moral is suggested. The second part of the thesis discusses the ideas of Mencius and Xunzi on whether morality is part of human nature. It tries to explicate Mencius’ idea of original goodness in terms of moral sentiments. It also looks into Xunzi’s argument that human nature is evil, and attempts to provide an alternative reading on the transformation of nature in terms of the transformation of motivation of actions.

Date of Award	2013
Original language	English
Awarding Institution	The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology