The effect of factional connections on anticorruption enforcement in China

Abstract

Patronage is commonly equated with poor performance as patronage appointees are deemed to be less motivated. But this may not be the case for promotion-seeking bureaucrats. Opposite to the common view, this paper argues that patronage can incentivize bureaucrats in a promotion tournament. In bureaucracies where promotion is dominated by patronage, patronless bureaucrats are less motivated to exert effort due to low chance of promotion. In contrast, politically connected bureaucrats have more incentives to exert effort since they need to compete against each other. The argument is tested by examining the pattern of local anticorruption enforcement in China's recent anticorruption campaign. Drawing on original monthly data of leader turnover and anticorruption at provincial level, I find the appointment of provincial leaders who were factionally connected to top Communist Party leaders significantly increased provincial anticorruption intensity. The gap in anticorruption enforcement is primarily driven by differential promotion incentives between patronage provincial leaders and their patronless counterparts. Taken together, patronage can play a positive incentive role in promotion tournaments.

Date of Award	2019
Original language	English
Awarding Institution	The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology