The geography of power elites in China : facts, causes and consequences

Abstract

In this study, I examine the geographical distribution of power elites in an authoritarian regime and investigate its causes and consequences using an exhaustive biographical dataset containing all of the Central Committee (CC) members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) during 1945-2012. I match their birthplaces in a geographic information system and arrive at the following two stylized facts. First, the Chinese power elites are unevenly distributed across regions, and the pattern of the geographical distribution has changed over time. Second, the elites are geographically concentrated. The concentration was initially very high before the Cultural Revolution (CR, 1966-1976), but sharply decreased during the CR and then remained at a certain level after 1982. I empirically test the roles of power sharing and meritocracy in shaping the preceding facts. Although initially, a large proportion of CC members were natives of the revolutionary bases built by the CCP during 1927-1937, an increasing number began to be selected from non-revolutionary bases, especially after the CR, which explains why the pattern of geographic distribution has changed and the concentration has decreased over time. However, the merit-based selection introduced after the CR has made the distribution uneven and slightly concentrated. Last, but not the least, this study shows that the distribution of power elites matters to the economic prosperity of the elites’ birth regions. A one increase in the number of CC members leads to about a one percentage point increase in the annual growth rate of GDP per capita, an effect I suggest is caused by resource allocation.

Date of Award	2014
Original language	English
Awarding Institution	The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology