Three essays on industrial organization

Abstract

In this thesis, I investigate how the vertical practices between firms affect or are affected by competition at different layers of an industry. In Chapter 1, I study how information sharing between rivals affects exclusion in a dynamic model. I present a novel mechanism for information sharing, showing that the vertical contracting practices between the incumbent firm and the retailers can induce strategic sharing by different types of entrants. In Chapter 2, I consider the optimal implementation of resale price maintenance (RPM) in a market where price violation may occur. I show that the manufacturer and the retailers fail to coordinate on the Pareto-dominant equilibrium due to noisy information, which gives rise to violations of RPM. In Chapter 3, I develop a theory on how firm structure responds to market competitiveness. I find that a reallocation of control rights can be an effective way of adapting to changing market competitiveness.

Date of Award	2017
Original language	English
Awarding Institution	The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology